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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Commonly, the reasons for employing the marital deduction in an
estate are compelling. The marital deduction where available and to
the extent of its availability determines in large measure the plan which
will be adopted. There may often be a conflict between the taxpayer's
fundamental philosophy of how the property should be disposed of and
the tax cost of following his view. In practice, it frequently happens
that a taxpayer when faced with the tax cost of a plan which does not
employ the marital deduction because of, e.g., his reluctance to give to
his surviving spouse the necessary control, will be persuaded to do so
because of the tax savings involved. In the same way, testators who
are adverse to "tying property up" over an extended period of time are
persuaded to do so when they become acquainted with the sizeable tax
savings that are possible. Sometimes there is a conflict between the desire
to obtain greater tax savings, possible through the use of long term trusts,
and the testator's objection to them as over-protecting his descendants
or dependents and discouraging in them the cultivation of qualities of
independence and self-reliance.
DISPOSrrION OF RESIDUE TO PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM TAx
ON DEATH OF SURVIVING SPOUSE
When the statute was amended in 1948 to equalize the situation in
the common law states with that in the community property states by
granting the marital deduction, it became the fashion for lawyers to
make provision for the marital deduction and to dispose of the balance
of the estate through the same techniques and methods which were in
use prior to the enactment of the marital deduction. In the unusual case
of the very large estate, the marital deduction, if used, would be more
than an adequate provision for the wife. Normally, however, this would
not be so and it would be necessary to make additional provision for the
surviving spouse. A trust may be used under the terms of which she
would have the right to part or all of the income, and in some cases
principal, for life. This trust, consisting of the residue, which we may
conveniently refer to herein as the residuary trust, would be so drawn
as to avoid being included in the estate of the surviving spouse at her
death. The tax would have been conceded on the marital deduction
trust and an effort would be made in this fashion to avoid the tax on the
residuary trust.
Since the property included in the marital deduction is required to
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be left in such a manner that it would normally be subjected to tax on
the death of the surviving spouse, the next objective would be so to plan
the disposition of the property in the estate of the surviving spouse as to
avoid the tax on the property included in the marital deduction. This
objective can in many cases be obtained by a plan under which the
marital deduction trust is decreased while the residuary trust is left intact
or is increased through accumulations. For example, if principal dis-
tributions are required to be made for the support of the surviving spouse
in addition to the income provided for, it would be preferable to make
this distribution from the marital deduction trust and the residuary trust
might well provide that no distributions from principal of that trust are
to be made until the marital deduction trust has been exhausted. In the
extreme form, the entire income of the residuary trust would be ac-
cumulated and the distributions of principal and income made from the
marital deduction trust until exhausted. Thereafter, the entire support
of the surviving spouse would come from the residuary trust. In this
extreme form, of course, there would be no estate tax on the death of
the surviving spouse because of the limited nature of her estate in the
residuary trust and the exhaustion of the marital deduction trust.
The marital deduction trust in many cases will have been drawn
so as to permit the surviving spouse to dispose of the trust property
during her lifetime through the exercise of a power of appointment by
deed and in this manner it is possible for the surviving spouse during her
life to dispose of property which would be taxable as part of her estate
if passed by the exercise of a general power of appointment by will or
by failure to exercise such power. Accordingly, the will or other in-
strument should be drawn so as to encourage the surviving spouse to
avoid the tax which would apply at her death through the making of
taxable gifts during her lifetime particularly if such gifts are to persons to
whom she would in the ordinary course leave property by her will, e.g.,
her lineal descendants. It is unlikely, however, that the surviving spouse
would be willing to exercise an inter vivos power of appointment unless
she was satisfied that the provision made for her in the residuary trust
would be adequate to provide for her needs in the event she did part with
a portion or even all of the marital deduction trust during her lifetime,
and, accordingly, a primary requirement of the residuary trust would be
to furnish her that assurance.
In the case of the will for Mr. Beaver, after the marital deduction
trust, if any, has been provided for, the residuary trust will have to pro-
vide for the support of Mrs. Beaver, the daughter, Linda, and the son,
Larry, the primary consideration being the support of Mrs. Beaver.
With the assurance of her support being adequately provided for by the
residuary trust, Mrs. Beaver would be in a position to carry out some
estate planning with regard to any amounts in the marital deduction
trust and the proceeds of the residuary trust would be excluded from
her estate.
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LONG RANGE PLANNING FOR PERIOD SUBSEQUENT TO
DEATH OF SURVIVING SPOUSE
Once the immediate problem, namely, the minimizing of the tax
on the death of the surviving spouse, has been taken care of as indicated
above by those provisions in a will which complement the marital de-
duction, or in cases where no marital deduction is available, we approach
an area of longer range tax planning in which it is difficult to be dog-
matic. The form of the advisable dispositions will vary greatly with the
size of the estate and with the particular family problems involved. Tax
considerations are frequently secondary and the aim of the draftsman is
to ensure that the taxpayer's plan of disposition can be carried out in a
manner which will result in a minimum tax loss.
In approaching long range estate tax planning, some initial re-
flections would appear to be in order with respect to the probability of
the estate tax continuing indefinitely in substantially its present form.
In the last decade there has been a gradual erosion of the federal estate
tax which is not entirely compensated for by the application of the tax
to heretofore untaxed brackets by reason of the progressive inflation
which has occurred, particularly in the period since World War II.
The adoption in 1948 of the marital deduction principle, the subsequent
enactment of the three-year rule on gifts in contemplation of death,
and the possibility of excluding a decedent's life insurance have made
the avoidance of any substantial amount of estate tax a relatively simple
matter in the smaller estates. The trend may be reversed and it is entirely
possible that Congress may decide upon a realistic revision of the estate
tax law for the purpose of converting it into a more significant revenue
raising measure, or that the increasing tempo of inflation will in effect
bring about an increase in the rates.
Where the marital deduction is not involved, the simplest form of
avoidance of estate tax would be the limiting of the progressive estates
provided for so that the successive beneficiaries do not have those inci-
dents of ownership which the federal estate tax law taxes. In this way
the tax may be postponed for long periods, or where the ultimate de-
scendants are numerous, may be avoided altogether.
This plan of avoidance is, of course, based on the conviction that
the federal estate tax law will remain wedded to the incidents of owner-
ship concept. Congress may some day decide to impose a tax upon the
death of successive life tenants and regard the death of the person who
had actually been enjoying the use of the property the occasion for the
imposition of the tax. The present form of the estate tax definitely
discourages the passing of outright ownership of property from one
generation to the next and puts a heavy premium on the employment of
trusts which with a little care and ingenuity can give each successive
generation the substantial economic benefits of ownership and enjoyment
of property without the attendant tax upon the termination of the in-
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terest. It would seem that any general revision of the estate tax law
designed to increase the revenue raising features of the law in any sub-
stantial way would be bound to do something about the present exemp-
tion of the long term trust.
Quite apart from the significant revenue losses involved, there is
also the possibility that the prevailing social philosophy may result in tax
legislation which would tend to discourage the protective tying-up of the
control of family fortunes by these long term trusts. If there is any
growth in such sentiment, a legislative precedent is at hand in the
British practice as the British rule of imposing a tax on the death of the
life tenant has been in effect since 1894. The probability of the Con-
gress adopting the British rule at the present time seems remote, but ad-
vocates of such a system have not been wanting. The existence of such
sentiments in Congress and elsewhere was again brought to light in the
hearings before the Subcommittee on Federal Tax Policy on Economic
Growth and Stability, December 5-16, 1955. In many long term trusts
it would not be wise to ignore the possibility of successive lifetime
interests ultimately being subjected to a tax, and in some cases it might
be desirable in the event of such legislation to terminate the trusts and
to incorporate a provision which could be used by the trustee to terminate
the trust in such circumstances. Such a provision in a trust would be
comparable to the built-in device which destroys a space missile when it
becomes evident that it will fail to orbit and would otherwise come
tumbling down upon us.
Under the existing law, the temptation is very great to avoid the
estate tax at the end of one generation through the use of successive life
or other limited estates because of the extraordinary amount of control
and flexibility which can be given to the life tenant through the use of
limited powers of appointment which, in many cases, are substantially
equivalent to outright ownership. As an example of such a disposition,
after the provision has been made for Mrs. Beaver, the first question
that must be decided is whether the shares of the children shall come to
them outright, or whether their shares shall be limited to a life estate
with a power of appointment. It is noted that the daughter, Linda, is
married to a medical student; it is entirely possible that this student,
Beaver's son-in-law, in the course of his professional life may through
his skill and industry accumulate a substantial estate of his own. On his
death, in the event Beaver's daughter, Linda, inherited this estate from
him, or in the event he inherited all or a part of Linda's estate in the
event she predeceased him, sizeable estate taxes might be incurred which
could have been avoided if Beaver had initially limited Linda's share to
a life estate with a limited power of appointment. In addition to the tax
saving features, this plan would also have the advantage of providing
for her security by preserving the principal throughout her life. In view
of the size of Beaver's estate, the income from Linda's share, under
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normal circumstances, should protect her adequately even in the event of
adversity and she could be given the right to dispose of the principal of
her trust by will to her children or to her husband. The passage of these
interests at her death, either through the exercise of the limited power or
the failure to exercise such power, would not be taxable.
With respect to the son, Larry, age sixteen, on the basis of the in-
formation given, there would appear to be no reason to retain his share
in trust beyond that point of time at which he would reasonably be
expected to have attained sufficient maturity to manage his own affairs.
Few parents today consider a child at twenty-one to be sufficiently mature
to handle large sums of money without supervision. A plan commonly
adopted would be to provide for a trust with discretionary distribution
during the period of his education, or, possibly, until termination, with
the principal being distributed in part at that age and the remainder at
age thirty or thirty-five. Any income not needed during the period could
be accumulated to be paid out to him on final distribution.
The savings in income taxes of keeping the interest of the brother
and sister in separate trusts could be significant and frequently in the
smaller estates the income tax savings are far more significant than the
estate tax savings. In this connection, part of the -benefits of accumu-
lating income at low tax rates in a testamentary trust may be lost if the
draftsman does not provide a plan for avoiding the five-year throwback
rule provided for in Section 665. Disregarding the case of where the
will or trust agreement was in effect as of January 1, 1954, the dis-
tribution of income accumulated after the beneficiary attains the age of
twenty-one, at least to the extent that it is in excess of $2,000, would be
subject to the throwback rule unless it were paid or credited to the
beneficiary to meet emergency needs, or where it was distributed to the
beneficiary as a final distribution made more than nine years after the
date of the last transfer to such trust (Section 665(b)). It would also
be possible, theoretically at least, to avoid the rule by having a sufficient
number of trusts so that accumulated income would not be in excess of
$2,000 in the case of any one trust.
The simplest and clearest case is the exemption in the case of the
final distribution. In many cases, the final distribution would in effect
be more than nine years after the creation of the trust and the problem
would not arise. Where the matter of the avoidance of the five-year
throwback rule is of sufficient importance, a provision postponing the
time for distribution, which would otherwise take place, to the year
following the ninth year would avoid the rule.
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